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THE CAUSAL NEXUS DOCTRINE: A FURTHER
LIMITATION ON THE EMPLOYER'S ADA DUTY
OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION IN THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
The opening section of the Americans with Disabilities Act'
("ADA" or "the Act") characterizes the legislation's purpose as
"address[ing] the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
people with disabilities."2 Among those areas of daily life targeted by
Congress in passing the ADA is employment, which is discussed in the
first section of the Act, Title 1.3 Unfortunately, despite the lofty goals
stated in the Act, analysis of ADA jurisprudence indicates that the
legislation has not lived up to its potential.! Though the legislature no
doubt genuinely intended to create a "clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities"5 and "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities, 6 neither purpose has been accomplished by Title I.
7
Rather, as one commentator has noted, courts have interpreted the
ADA's language "so narrowly.., that it rarely protects the people for
whose benefit it was adopted.,
8
A recent indication that the ADA has failed to fulfill its promise is
the July 26, 2007 introduction of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Restoration Act of 2007 ("ADARA") in both the House of
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. Id. § 12101(b)(4).
3. Id. §§ 12111-12117.
4. See Melanie D. Winegar, Note, Big Talk, Broken Promises: How Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Failed Disabled Workers, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1267, 1267
(2006).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
6. Id. § 12101(b)(2).
7. See generally Winegar, supra note 4, at 1267-68 (explaining how courts have
interpreted the ADA's language too narrowly, "abus[ed] summary judgment standards in
ADA cases," and failed to understand that "the basis of disability rights is civil rights").
8. Id. at 1267.
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Representatives9 and the Senate.' ° Though this bill will be mentioned
again below," for the time being it will suffice to note the text of the
ADARA's "Findings and Purposes" section, which states that
"decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court have unduly narrowed
the broad scope of protection afforded by the [ADA]," 2 and to
highlight the stated aim of the ADARA:
to reinstate the original congressional intent regarding
the definition of disability ... by clarifying that [ADA]
... protection . . . is available for all individuals who
are-
(A) subjected to adverse treatment based on actual
or perceived impairment, or a record of
impairment; or
(B) adversely affected-
i. by prejudiced attitudes, such as myths,
fears, ignorance, or stereotypes
concerning disability or particular
disabilities; or
ii. by the failure to remove societal and
institutional barriers, including
communication, transportation, and
architectural barriers, or the failure to
provide reasonable modifications to
policies, practices, and procedures,
reasonable accommodations, and
auxiliary aids and services."
Though not specifically mentioned in the ADARA, one of several
ways in which courts have tried to restrict employee causes of action
under Title I of the ADA is through the development of the "causal
nexus" or "causal connection" doctrine. 4 To understand this doctrine, it
9. H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). The House bill is sponsored by
Representative Steny H. Hoyer and currently has 241 co-sponsors. Id.
10. S. 1881, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). The Senate bill is sponsored by Senator Tom
Harkin and currently has two co-sponsors, Senators Edward Kennedy and Arlen Specter. Id.
11. See infra Parts IV.C, V.
12. S. 1881, § 2(a)(2).
13. Id. § 2(b)(3).
14. This doctrine will also be referred to as the "Felix rule" or "Felix doctrine." See
generally Cheryl L. Anderson, What Is "Because of the Disability" Under the Americans with
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is necessary to grasp several key ADA concepts, including "person with
a disability," "major life activity," and "reasonable accommodation." In
general, the ADA requires two things: first, an individual with a
disability must have "[a] physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits [that individual in] one or more . ..major life
activities,"' 5 and second, an employer must take reasonable steps to
accommodate such an individual with a disability in the workplace. 6
The causal nexus doctrine, first articulated in Felix v. New York City
Transit Authority1 7 and Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc.,"' refuses to
require an employer to accommodate any aspects of an employee's
disability that do not themselves amount to disabilities within the
statutory definition. 9  In other words, "there must be a causal
connection between the major life activity that is limited and the
accommodation sought."20  As the Wood court explained, such a
doctrine is rooted in the idea that "'the ADA requires employers to...
accommodate limitations, not disabilities."' 2' Additionally, as noted in
Felix, proponents of the causal nexus approach see it as a necessary
restraint on ADA causes of action, without which the current (and, in
the Felix court's view, appropriately limited) understanding of disability
would be "eviscerate[d]. 2
In framing its causal nexus approach, the Felix court attempted to
distinguish several prior cases cited by the plaintiffs.23 Included among
these cases was Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of
Administration, a 1995 decision in which the Seventh Circuit asserted
that "an intermittent impairment that is a characteristic manifestation of
an admitted disability is ... part of the underlying disability and hence a
condition that the employer must reasonably accommodate., 24  The
Disablities Act? Reasonable Accomodation, Causation, and the Windfall Doctrine, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 347-56 (2006); Kelly Cahill Timmons, Limiting
"Limitations": The Scope of the Duty of Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 313, 324-40 (2005).
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) (2007).
16. Id. § 1630.2(o).
17. 324 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2003).
18. 339 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2003).
19. Felix, 324 F.3d at 105.
20. Wood, 339 F.3d at 687.
21. Id. (citations omitted).
22. 324 F.3d at 107.
23. Id. at 105-07.
24. 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Felix court's distinction of Vande Zande notwithstanding, this language,
when placed in context, seems contrary to the notion that an employer
need only accommodate those aspects of an employee's disability that
are causally linked to the limited major life activity. However, after
seeming to question this aspect of the Vande Zande holding in Yindee v.
CCH Inc. ,25 the Seventh Circuit recently appeared to embrace the causal
nexus doctrine in dicta in Squibb v. Memorial Medical Center.26 For
reasons further discussed below," this development is contrary to the
stated aims and statutory provisions of the ADA.
This Note addresses the origins and applications of the Felix and
Wood causal nexus doctrine in the interest of assessing the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Squibb. Part II provides background information
necessary to a basic understanding of ADA issues. Part III examines
the causal nexus approach as outlined in the Felix and Wood decisions,
then specifically analyzes the sequence of Seventh Circuit ADA Title I
cases from Vande Zande to Squibb. Part IV argues that the Seventh
Circuit was wrong to embrace the causal nexus doctrine in Squibb and
suggests an alternative approach. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE ADA: ORIGINS, INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK, AND
TERMINOLOGY
A. ADA Title I: Legislative Origins
Legislation can be best understood by examining its antecedents.
The Act, which was signed into law in July of 1990,8 can be traced back
to both the Civil Rights Act of 196429 and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.' o The Civil Rights Act "had a profound effect on the direction that
the [disability rights] movement was to take in the next 25 years,"31
though it did not specifically address discrimination against persons with
disabilities. Most importantly, the Civil Rights Act carried in its wake
federal laws that did directly address the needs of persons with
25. 458 F.3d 599, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2006).
26. 497 F.3d 775, 785 (7th Cir. 2007).
27. See infra Part IV.
28. JONATHAN R. MOOK, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
& EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS § 1.01 (2007).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (2000).
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000).
31. MOOK, supra note 28, § 1.03[2].
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disabilities, including the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968,32 the 1970
amendments to the Urban Mass Transportation Act,33 and the
Rehabilitation Act?'
In passing the Rehabilitation Act, Congress moved beyond its prior
recognition that persons with disabilities required vocational training to
find success in the workplace, acknowledging that even if properly
trained, such persons remained subject to discrimination by employers.35
The legislation, therefore, not only prohibited discrimination by federal
employers, federal contractors, and programs receiving federal financial
support, but also required federal employers and contractors to
implement affirmative action programs to increase the presence of
persons with disabilities in the federal workforce. 6 Though it did not
apply to private employers, and was thus an incomplete victory for
Americans with disabilities, the Rehabilitation Act still represented a
major milestone in the struggle for a truly equal workplace. Indeed,
while it would take almost two more decades for Congress to address
discrimination in the private sector by passing the ADA, a consensus
quickly emerged among the courts that the ADA "[was] to be an
expansion of the protections afforded under the Rehabilitation Act...
not to diverge from the law that has been developed under the
Rehabilitation Act's provisions.""
B. ADA Title I: Interpretive Framework/EEOC Regulations
For guidance in interpreting the dictates of the ADA, courts turn not
only to the language of the Act and that of its predecessor, the
Rehabilitation Act, but also to the ADA regulations issued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and mandated by the
Act itself.38 However, while these regulations are certainly valuable
tools for employers in determining their obligations under the ADA,
their precise role remains unclear. As the EEOC itself has stated, the
regulations cannot "supply the 'correct' answer in advance for each
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4156 (2000).
33. Pub. L. No. 91-453, § 8, 84 Stat. 962 (1970).
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796; see also MOOK, supra note 28, § 1.03[2]-[3] (providing an
overview of the legislative precursors to the ADA).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2000).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (2000); 29 U.S.C.A. § 791 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
37. MOOK, supra note 28, § 2.01[4]; see, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44
F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995).
38. See MOOK, supra note 28, § 1.04[5][b].
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employment decision concerning an individual with a disability."39
Furthermore, considerable disagreement remains as to the role that the
EEOC regulations should play in guiding the courts in Title I matters. '
Though the pre-ADA court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. stated that EEOC regulations should
generally control unless "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute, 4 1 the ADA-era court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.
declined to adopt the EEOC definitional section for the Act. 2
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the EEOC guidelines and
regulations have been and will continue to be a major component of the
ADA's interpretive framework.
C. ADA Title I: Terminology
1. Person with a Disability
The ADA and the accompanying EEOC regulations identically
define a qualified 3 person with a disability as one who "[has] a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual . . . [or has] a record of such an
impairment . . . or [is] regarded as having such an impairment.""
Because the drafters of the ADA intended the legislation to adapt to
societal changes, they purposely made this key definition broad and
flexible.4 ' This intent is suggested by the fact that the definition of
"person with a disability" depends entirely on how one defines
impairment, substantially limits, and major life activity. Further
broadening the scope of the definition is the idea that a person with a
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 App. (2007).
40. See MOOK, supra note 28, § 1.04[5][b].
41. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
42. 527 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1999).
43. Though the "qualified" aspect of "person with a disability" is not the focus of this
Note, it still must be recognized. To merit accommodation under the ADA, a person must
(1) meet the prerequisites for the job at issue, such as experience and education, and (2) be
able to perform the "essential functions" of the job with or without reasonable
accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2004); see also MOOK, supra note 28, § 4.02.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2007). As with much of
the ADA, this definition was drawn from the Rehabilitation Act, which includes a similar
definition for "disability." 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (2000).
45. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 27 (1990) (House Judiciary Committee). Congress
noted that a flexible definition would allow for the incorporation of newly recognized
disorders into the ADA's protected class in the future. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989)
(Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources).
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disability can be so defined given a "record of their disability,16 or, most
notably, that the perceptions of others can classify an individual as a
person with a disability under the ADA, even absent actual physical or
mental impairments. 7
a. Physical or Mental Impairment
Focusing on the first of the ADA's three sub-definitions of disability,
one must begin by asking what does and does not constitute a physical
or mental impairment. This term is not further clarified in the language
of the Act itself, but the EEOC regulations provide considerable
guidance:
Physical or mental impairment means:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one
or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory
(including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and
endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional
or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.'
Additionally, the EEOC addresses physical or mental states that do not
meet the ADA definition of impairment, including simple physical
characteristics (such as hair or eye color), physiological conditions not
caused by a disorder (such as pregnancy), personality traits (such as
poor judgment or irritability), personal disadvantages (such as
indigence), advanced age, or sexual preference. 9 The ADA also
specifically omits several subsets of impairments or conditions: "sexual
behavior disorders,"5°  "compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or
46. See MOOK, supra note 28, § 3.03 (summarizing "record of disability" aspect of ADA
definition).
47. See id. § 3.04 (summarizing "regards as" aspect of ADA definition).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2007).
49. MOOK, supra note 28, § 3.02[1][b]-[c].
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2000). The statute includes transvestitism, transsexualism,
pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, and "gender identity disorders not resulting from
physical impairments" within this sub-grouping. Id.
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pyromania,""1 and "psychoactive substance use disorders."52 However,
the definitions found in the ADA and the EEOC Title I guidelines,
despite their apparent specificity, are accompanied by a warning: They
are not to be used in formulating a laundry list of qualifying
impairments under the ADA, but rather should be regarded as flexible
and general in nature.53
b. "Major Life Activity"
For the ADA to apply to an employee, it is not enough that that
person has a physical or mental impairment. The impairment must also
substantially limit at least one major life activity." As with the term
"impairment," the EEOC regulations provide a helpful, if not complete,
list of major life activities, including "[c]aring for oneself; [p]erforming
manual tasks; [w]alking; [s]eeing; [h]earing; [sipeaking; [b]reathing;
[1]earning; and [w]orking."55 Again, though, it must be emphasized that
"[t]he lists of major life activities identified by... the EEOC ... are not
'exhaustive' and the courts have taken varying views as to what activities
should be deemed 'major life activities' for purposes of ADA analysis. 5 6
Though the lower courts had already begun to explore the meaning
of major life activity within the ADA framework, the Supreme Court
did not directly address the issue until its 1998 decision in Bragdon v.
Abbott." In Bragdon, the HIV-positive plaintiff maintained that her
disease was an impairment that limited her in the major life activity of
reproduction. 8 In a 5-4 decision, the Court agreed with the plaintiff.59
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy stated that "[r]eproduction falls
well within the phrase 'major life activity.' Reproduction and the sexual
dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself."6 Justice
Kennedy went on to refer to the "breadth, 61 of the term major life
51. Id. § 12211(b)(2).
52. Id. § 12211(b)(3).
53. MOOK, supra note 28, § 3.0211][a] (citing 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(b)).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2007). The U.S. Supreme Court
defined a "major life activity" as "of central importance to daily life" in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
55. See MOOK, supra note 28, § 3.02[4][a] (citations omitted).
56. Id.
57. 524 U.S. 624 (1998); see also MOOK, supra note 28, § 3.02[4][b].
58. See 524 U.S. at 631.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 638.
61. Id.
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activity, in sharp contrast to the narrower construction advanced by
Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent.62
While Bragdon was not a Title I case (it instead involved public
accommodations for persons with disabilities under Title III of the
ADA), its holding applied to Title I employment cases because the
definition of person with a disability is consistent throughout the ADA.
Given that the language in Bragdon was fairly broad, it might seem that
subsequent Supreme Court ADA decisions would advance a fairly
expansive definition of major life activity. This has hardly been the case.
Indeed, two relatively recent Supreme Court decisions have included
language questioning whether even working, which is listed as an
example in the EEOC regulations, should be considered a major life
activity.63 In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Court pointed out that
including working as a major life activity seemed to be an exercise in
circular logic,6' a point that it repeated in Williams, in which it
emphasized the "conceptual difficulties inherent in the argument that
working could be a major life activity."65 Such cases at the highest level
have shown that the Bragdon decision may have been the high-water
mark for a more inclusive interpretation of major life activity under Title
I of the ADA.
c. Substantial Limitation
As the above briefly illustrates, the inherent ambiguity of the
adjective major has allowed the courts to advance markedly different
notions of what constitutes a major life activity. Similarly, the
imprecision of the adjective substantial, when coupled with the absence
of any definition in the ADA itself, leaves courts considerable leeway in
deciding whether a physical or mental impairment substantially limits a
person in a major life activity. The EEOC regulations do provide some
assistance in this regard, though it must again be noted that some courts
have declined to adopt the EEOC definitions in ADA Title I cases.66
For courts that are willing to consider the EEOC guidelines, the
62. Id. at 660 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized "major life activities" as "repetitively performed
and essential in the day-to-day existence of a normally functioning individual." Id.
63. See generally Winegar, supra note 4.
64. 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999). "We note.., that there may be some conceptual difficulty
in defining 'major life activities' to include work ...." Id.
65. 534 U.S. 184, 200 (2002); see infra Part II.C.
66. See supra Part II.B.
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meaning of substantial limitation must be understood as related to the
abilities of the "average person., 67 A person is substantially limited if
either: (1) that person cannot "perform a major life activity that the
average person in the general population can perform,"' or (2) that
person is "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which [that] individual can perform a ...major life
activity as compared to . . the average person in the general
population., 69  Additionally, the EEOC guidelines provide specific
factors to be considered when deciding whether a substantial limitation
on a major life activity exists. These factors include the "nature and
severity of the impairment," 70 the "duration or expected duration of the
impairment,, 7' and the "permanent or long term impact ...resulting
from the impairment.,
72
Whether they consult these EEOC guidelines or not, courts deciding
whether a limitation on a major life activity is substantial under the
ADA are obliged to consider the case law on the subject. This case law
is fairly extensive, but for the purposes of this Note, a brief discussion of
relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence is sufficient. The Supreme Court
has attempted to clarify the meaning of substantial limitation in several
ADA cases, including Bragdon, Sutton, and Williams.
In Bragdon, the Court had to decide whether the plaintiff's HIV-
positive status imposed a substantial limitation on the major life activity
of reproduction, given that sexual activity on her part created a risk to
both her partner and to any child conceived. 73 The Court concluded that
even if the chances of either the partner or the child contracting HIV
were fairly minimal, the risk (and therefore the limitation on the major
life activity of reproduction) was substantial.74 It went on to note that
substantial limitations cannot be equated with "utter inabilities," stating
that "[w]hen significant limitations result from the impairment, the
67. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1) (2007).
68. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).
69. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
70. Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i).
71. Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii).
72. Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(iii).
73. 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998).
74. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed in his dissent, pointing out that "[w]hile
individuals infected with HIV may choose not to engage in [sexual and reproductive]
activities, there is no support in language, logic, or our case law for the proposition that such
voluntary choices constitute a 'limit' on one's own life activities." Id. at 661 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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definition is met even if the difficulties are not insurmountable., 75 Thus,
while the Bragdon Court explained how substantial limitation could be
interpreted too narrowly, it did not necessarily provide a more
comprehensive definition of the term.
A year after Bragdon, the Court took up the issue of whether a
physical or mental impairment substantially limits a major life activity
when the effects of that impairment can be mitigated. The primary case
addressing this question is Sutton, in which two pilots sued United
Airlines for discrimination under Title I of the ADA, claiming that they
had been denied employment because of their extremely poor vision.6
In a 7-2 decision, the Court found for the defendant, stating rather
succinctly that "[a] 'disability' exists only where an impairment
'substantially limits' a major life activity, not where it 'might,' 'could,' or
'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not
taken."' 7 In other words, the Court held that because the plaintiffs could
correct their vision with eyeglasses or contact lenses, their myopia did
not substantially limit a major life activity, and therefore, they did not
qualify as persons with disabilities. 78 Both this aspect of the holding and
the Court's skeptical remarks regarding working as a major life activity
show the Court construing the ADA more narrowly in Sutton than it
had in Bragdon.
This limited approach continued in Williams. The plaintiff, Ella
Williams, was terminated by Toyota after missing significant time from
her job in a manufacturing plant.79 Williams maintained that her
impairments of carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis interfered with
her ability to engage in the major life activities of performing manual
tasks, lifting, and working, and thus that her dismissal was disability
75. Id. at 641 (opinion of the Court).
76. 527 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1999).
77. Id. at 482. Justice Stevens, dissenting, opined that mitigating measures should not be
considered in deciding whether an individual has a disability under the ADA. Id. at 495-513.
According to Justice Stevens, when the ADA is properly construed according to "customary
tools of statutory construction," it "focuses on ... past or present physical condition without
regard to mitigation that has resulted from rehabilitation, self-improvement, prosthetic
devices, or medication." Id. at 495. Stevens added that "in order to be faithful to the
remedial purpose of the [ADA], we should give it a generous, rather than a miserly,
construction." Id.
78. Id. at 486-89. The Court followed a similar rationale in the concurrent ADA
"mitigation" case of Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999). In Murphy,
the Court held that a truck mechanic with hypertension was not disabled because he could
take medication to control his blood pressure. Id.
79. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 189-90 (2002).
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discrimination. 80 The Court disagreed. In a unanimous decision, it
defined "substantial limitation on a major life activity" as "prevent[ing]
or severely restrict[ing] the individual from doing activities that are of
central importance to most people's daily lives.",8' Further, it stated that
"[t]he impairment's impact must also be permanent or long term" 82 and
that the determination of an impairment's effect on an individual must
be subject to an "individualized assessment., 83 Needless to say, the
contrast between such language and that in Bragdon, which merely
equated "substantial" with "significant" limitations, is stark.
2. "Reasonable Accommodation"
Once it has been determined that an employee or applicant for
employment is a qualified person with a disability under the ADA, that
person may not be denied "reasonable accommodations"' by an
employer or prospective employer. However, as with so many aspects
of Title I, this requirement can be as complex in application as it appears
clear-cut at first glance. Two questions must be answered in deciding
what sort of accommodation is required. First, is the desired
accommodation "reasonable"? Second, even if the accommodation is
otherwise reasonable, does it impose an "undue hardship" on the
employer?
a. What Is Reasonable?
Though the ADA does not specifically define "reasonable
accommodation," the original EEOC regulations provide a tripartite
definition of the concept. According to the regulations, a reasonable
accommodation can be a modification or adjustment to the job
application process, to the work environment itself, or to any aspect of
employment that will allow the person "with a disability to "enjoy equal
benefits and privileges of employment."'85 Additionally, the EEOC
regulations and the ADA itself provide an identical (though not
exclusive) list of possible accommodations. Such accommodations may
include:
80. Id. at 190.
81. Id. at 198.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 199.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
85. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii) (2007).
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(i) Making existing facilities.., readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(ii) Job restructuring; part-time or modified work
schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition
or modifications of equipment or devices; appropriate
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials, or policies; [or] the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters.
Employees with disabilities may also be entitled to other reasonable
accommodations such as paid or unpaid leave to obtain medical
treatment, accessible company transportation, and reserved parking
87
spaces.
Just as courts addressing ADA claims must decide when a life
activity is major or a limitation on that life activity is substantial, courts
assessing an employer's duty to accommodate an employee with a
disability must determine whether that accommodation is reasonable.
The EEOC regulations suggest that this reasonableness analysis should
depend entirely upon the extent to which an accommodation has the
desired effect.' According to the EEOC, an accommodation is
reasonable as long as it successfully levels the playing field for the
covered party, regardless of any expenditure or inconvenience caused by
the accommodation itself.89  This interpretation of reasonable
accommodation was strongly criticized at the circuit court level' before
being clearly rejected by the Supreme Court in US Airways, Inc. v.
86. Id. § 1630.2(o)(2); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
87. 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(o) (2007).
88. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1) (2007). In explaining "reasonable accommodation," all
three sub-definitions refer to the effectiveness of the accommodation in relation to the
employee, but none of the three mention the "reasonableness" of the accommodations vis-A-
vis the employer. Id.
89. Id.; see also MOOK, supra note 28, § 6.02 (providing an overview of the EEOC
definition of "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA).
90. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying
principles of negligence in rejecting the EEOC approach and adopting a rule that for an
accommodation to be reasonable, its cost cannot be "disproportionate to the benefit");
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995) ("'Reasonable' is a
relational term: it evaluates the desirability of a particular accommodation according to the
consequences that the accommodation will produce. This requires an inquiry not only into
the benefits of the accommodation but into its costs as well.").
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Barnett.9'
As an accommodation for his back injury, the plaintiff employee in
Barnett requested and was granted a transfer from his physically
demanding job as a cargo handler to a less strenuous position in the
mailroom. 92 However, when two employees with more seniority under
company policy applied for the mailroom job, US Airways awarded the
job to one of the senior employees and terminated Barnett. 93 Barnett
sued under the ADA, claiming that the company had failed to
reasonably accommodate him by denying him the mailroom position.9'
In upholding summary judgment on behalf of the defendant, the
Supreme Court rejected Barnett's contention that the EEOC guidelines
were controlling in requiring only that a reasonable accommodation be
"effective. '" 95  The Court instead turned to lower court decisions in
holding that a plaintiff must show that a proposed accommodation is
"feasible" or "plausible," rather than merely effective. 96 In 2002 the
EEOC amended its enforcement guidelines to reflect the Barnett
analysis of reasonable accommodation. 9
b. Undue Hardship
According to the ADA, an employer must provide reasonable
accommodations to an employee with a disability, "unless such covered
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business."98  Thus, even if an
accommodation is reasonable within the Barnett framework (i.e., it is
plausible or feasible), an employer can still raise the defense that
implementing the accommodation will be too expensive or otherwise
problematic.' The Act presents four factors to be used in determining
whether a particular accommodation presents an employer with an
91. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
92. Id. at 394.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 401. The court stated that Barnett had misread the language of the EEOC
guidelines: "The EEOC regulations do say that reasonable accommodations 'enable' a person
with a disability to perform the essential functions of a task. But that phrasing simply
emphasizes the statutory provision's basic objective. The regulations do not say that 'enable'
and 'reasonable' mean the same thing." Id.
96. Id. at 401-02 (citations omitted).
97. See MOOK, supra note 28, § 6.02 n.18.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
99. MOOK, supra note 28, § 7.02 (citations omitted).
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undue hardship."t° These factors can be summarized as focusing on the
nature and cost of the accommodation, °' the nature of the specific
facility involved, 2 the nature of the employer,' 3 and the nature of that
employer's business operations." ' At a more basic level, these factors
can simply be divided between cost-related and non-cost-related
considerations, the latter of which can include accommodations that
would "fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business. ' '°
III. THE CAUSAL NEXUS DOCTRINE AND REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION
A. Establishing the Causal Nexus Doctrine
At this point, the scope of this Note narrows considerably. Bearing
in mind the overarching framework of Title I outlined in the previous
section, the inquiry now becomes more specific: What, exactly, must an
employer reasonably accommodate? According to the ADA,
employers must reasonably accommodate "the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability. '"'0' However, this definition begs for further clarification as to
precisely which limitations must be accommodated. In particular, when
a person has an impairment that limits a major life activity, and is thus
considered a person with a disability, must an employer accommodate
all limitations that are manifestations of that disability (assuming that
such accommodations are reasonable and do not impose an undue
100. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2000).
101. Id. § 12111(10)(B)(i).
102. Id. § 12111(10)(B)(ii). These factors include the financial resources available to the
facility, the number of employees at the facility, and the overall impact (financial and
otherwise) on the facility and its operations. Id.
103. Id. § 12111(10)(B)(iii). These factors include the overall financial resources of the
company, the size of the company, and "the number, type, and location of its facilities." Id.
104. Id. § 12111(10)(B)(iv). These factors include the "composition, structure, and
functions of the workforce" of the employer and "the geographic separateness,
administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question" to the employer.
Id.
105. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (2007). As an example, consider a person with a visual
impairment who wants to work at a dimly lit nightclub. The employer would suffer an
"undue hardship" in accommodating that person because it would have to use bright lights in
the club, thus "fundamentally alter[ing]" the nature of its business. 29 C.F.R. App.
§ 1630.2(p) (2007).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000); see also Timmons, supra note 14, at 314.
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hardship),' °7 or only those limitations that specifically limit the stated
major life activity? Though the Supreme Court has yet to answer this
question, those federal appellate courts that have addressed the problem
have adopted the latter, narrower approach. This approach has been
dubbed the causal nexus doctrine.
1. Felix v. New York City Transit Authority
The first major opinion to recognize the causal nexus doctrine was
issued by the Second Circuit in Felix, decided in 2003.108 The plaintiff,
Denise Felix, was hired by the New York City Transit Authority
("NYCTA") as a railroad clerk in 1994.'0° Her position involved selling
tokens and passes and answering passenger questions from a booth
located in a subway station.1 On November 26, 1995, Felix was
instructed to serve as an "extra" railroad clerk, relieving other clerks
during their breaks.1 ' As she made her way by train to do just that, she
was informed that the clerk whom she was to replace had been killed by
a firebomb. 2 Trapped in the train and observing the smoky aftermath
of the bombing, Felix became extremely upset as she contemplated how
easily her unfortunate co-worker's fate could have been her own."3 She
was taken to the emergency room following the incident, and soon
thereafter doctors determined that she was suffering from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD ,)."1
Felix's PTSD resulted in "feelings of apprehension and anxiety,
recurrent problems with insomnia, and an inability to work in the
subways.""..5 Her "restricted work, temporary" status kept her out of
work from December 1995 to August 1996, at which point she asked to
be reassigned to a position outside of a subway station."6 This request
was denied by the NYCTA, and Felix did not return to work, her status
107. See supra Part 1I.C.2.b.
108. Felix v. New York City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 2003).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. "Felix saw the smoke-filled platform and ... was traumatized by the realization
that she could have been killed .. " ld.
114. Id. According to Felix's doctors, she could not do any work in the subway, but
could work in a clerical position. Id. at 104.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 103-04.
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having been reclassified as "no work, temporary" in mid-August 1996."17
On November 26, 1996, the NYCTA fired Felix under a New York Civil
Service statute that permitted termination of employees unable to work
for a year."'
In July of 2000, Felix sued the NYCTA for employment
discrimination under Title I of the ADA." 9 The NYCTA moved for
summary judgment, which was granted by the district court based on the
defendant's argument that "there was no nexus between the major life
activity impaired and the accommodation requested."'"2 Reviewing the
district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, the Second Circuit
framed the essential question as "[w]hether there must be a causal link
between the specific condition which limits a major life activity and the
accommodation required."'' The court answered this question in the
affirmative and upheld summary judgment for the defendant. In so
doing, it made important assertions as to the nature of Felix's disability.
According to the Felix court, Felix's disability was her insomnia,
which substantially limited her in the major life activity of sleeping.
2 3
However, her requested accommodation of working somewhere other
than in the subway was not premised on her inability to sleep, but rather
on her fear of returning to the location of a traumatic event. Unlike
her insomnia, this subway anxiety aspect of her PTSD did not
substantially limit any major life activity, and was therefore
characterized by the court as a "non-disability impairment.' 12' By the
court's reasoning, such "impairments that do not amount to a 'disability'
as defined by [the ADA] do not require accommodation.' ' 26 The court
noted that the "common traumatic origin" of Felix's insomnia and of
her subway anxiety did not require her employer to accommodate her
anxiety any more than it would have to accommodate all of an
117. Id. at 104.
118. Id. (citing N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 71).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 108.
123. Id. at 105.
124. Id. at 106-07. "Felix did not argue to the NYCTA that she was unable to work in
the subway because such work aggravated her insomnia; she told the NYCTA that she could
not work in the subway because she was 'terrified of being alone and closed in."' Id.
125. Id. at 105.
126. Id.
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employee's injuries or conditions resulting from a car accident.'27
The court rejected the plaintiff's use of several prior cases in which
employers were required to accommodate impairments related to
AIDS,'28 epilepsy, 29 paralysis, 3° and mental illness.' In distinguishing
such cases, the court noted that the impairments to be accommodated in
those cases "flowed directly from the disability itself."'32  Conversely,
Felix's fear of the subway did not "flow directly" from her disability of
insomnia.'33 In making this determination, the court necessarily rebuffed
Felix's argument that her disability was not insomnia but rather PTSD,
and thus that her fear of the subway did "flow directly" from her
disability.34 The court dubbed her PTSD and insomnia "two mental
conditions that derive from the same traumatic incident," and thereby
labeled them two distinct entities. 135
The Felix court also extolled the sound public policy behind its
causal nexus doctrine. It pointed out that, while "[t]he ADA serves the
important function of ensuring that people with disabilities are given the
same opportunities and are able to enjoy the same benefits as other
Americans[,] ... it does not authorize a preference for disabled people
generally.' ' 136 As the court saw it, allowing plaintiffs like Denise Felix to
recover would drastically alter the ADA definition of a disability by
"requir[ing] treating people with disabilities better than others who are
not disabled but have the same impairment for which accommodation is
sought.',37 The court deemed the interpretation of the ADA advocated
127. Id. By way of analogy, the court explained that an employee who lost use of his
legs in a car accident would be entitled to reasonable accommodations related to his inability
to perform the major life activity of walking, but not to accommodations for arm injuries
(sustained in the same accident) that lowered his typing speed but did not substantially limit a
major life activity. Id.
128. Id. at 105-06 (discussing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)).
129. Id at 106 (discussing Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208 (2d
Cir. 2001)).
130. Id at 106 (discussing Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir.
1995)); see infra Part III.B.1.
131. Id at 106 (discussing McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir.
1999)).
132. Id at 105.
133. Id. at 106.
134. Id. at 107.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. Applying the fact pattern from Felix, this would mean requiring an
accommodation for Felix's fear of the subway as part of her disability but not for another,
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by the plaintiff an "expansive reading . . . that frustrates its plain
statutory meaning." 3'
2. Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc.
Only six months after the Second Circuit's decision in Felix, the
Eighth Circuit adopted the causal nexus doctrine in Wood.'39 Charles
Wood drove a concrete mixer for Crown Redi-Mix and was injured
when he fell into a hole at a concrete plant.'" The fall caused permanent
nerve damage and aggravated a prior back injury, factors that caused
Wood's physician to place permanent restrictions on his work tasks."'
These restrictions "prohibited [Wood] from driving a ready-mix truck,
from lifting in excess of fifty pounds, and from performing extensive
bending, twisting, and lifting."'42 Approximately six months after the
accident, Crown terminated Wood because it could not accommodate
his restrictions by offering him a less physically demanding position."'
After his union failed to pursue the matter to his satisfaction, Wood
sued Crown (and the union) for disability discrimination under Title I of
the ADA.' 44
The district court granted all of the defendants' motions for
summary judgment because Wood failed to present a prima facie case of
discrimination. On appeal, Wood maintained that his physical
impairment (the existence of which was not disputed by the defense)
substantially limited him in the "major life activities of walking,
standing, turning, bending, lifting, working, and procreation.' 46 While
conceding that each of these activities is a major life activity, the court
dismissed each activity (other than procreation) as insufficiently limited
by his injuries to allow Wood a cause of action. '47 Turning its attention
non-disabled employee who also happens to share that fear.
138. Id.
139. Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2003).
140. Id. at 684.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 685-86. The court emphasized that while Wood's ability to walk, stand, turn,
bend, and lift had all been reduced by his accident, none of these abilities were entirely
prevented or severely restricted as required by Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.
v. Williams. Id.
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to the major life activity of procreation, the court then noted that Wood
had probably failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact because he
had provided no substantiation of his claim that he was "completely
unable to procreate.' '4 8 However, rather than relying on this rationale,
the court explained why, even if Wood were substantially limited in his
ability to procreate, he was not entitled to an accommodation. 9
The court's explanation for denying Wood's right to an
accommodation was a reiteration of the causal nexus approach outlined
in Felix. The court first explained that employers are not required to
accommodate disabilities, but rather the limitations of persons with
disabilities.'9 Noting the similarities between the fact patterns in Felix
and the present case,"' the court then discussed why "there must be a
causal connection between the major life activity that is limited and the
accommodation sought. 152  Appealing to common sense and
interpreting congressional intent, the court elucidated why "[i]t would
be a strange result, and one we do not believe Congress intended, to
have the viability of Wood's claim that he should have been
accommodated as an employee of a truck-driving company turn solely
on whether or not he was impotent.' 53
3. The Causal Nexus Doctrine Post-Wood
The causal nexus approach remains good law in both the Second and
Eighth Circuits. Indeed, in a relatively recent case, Nuzum v. Ozark
Automotive Distributors, Inc., the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the
doctrine.' The court considered the claim of Steven Nuzum, a
warehouse employee who injured his elbow lifting a heavy auto starter
and was placed on permanent medical restrictions due to the resulting
tendonitis"' In an opinion structured remarkably similarly to that in
Wood, the court first rejected Nuzum's asserted substantially limited
148. Id. at 686.
149. Id. at 686-87.
150. Id. at 687.
151. Id. The court seemed to characterize Felix's disability as insomnia (rather than
PTSD) and Wood's disability as impotence (rather than a back injury). Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 432 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Didier v. Schwan Food Co., 465 F.3d 838, 842-
43 (8th Cir. 2006).
155. Nuzum, 432 F.3d at 841.
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major life activities claim,156 then added that the causal nexus doctrine
defeated his claim anyway."'
In addition to the Second and Eighth Circuits, the D.C. Circuit has
also adopted the causal nexus doctrine."" In Long v. Howard University,
the plaintiff, a Ph.D. candidate, sued Howard University for failing to
accommodate the pulmonary fibrosis that had forced him to take a
prolonged leave of absence from his doctoral program. 9 Long alleged
under Title III of the ADA that the university had discriminated by
refusing to re-admit him to the program with the same academic
standing that he had merited prior to his medical leave.' 60 Though Long
was not a Title I case, the court applied the causal nexus principles of
the Felix and Wood Title I decisions in holding that a genuine issue of
material fact existed, and thus that summary judgment was
inappropriate.' 6' As framed by the court, that genuine issue of material
fact was whether Long's asserted limitations on walking and breathing
were causally connected to his desired accommodation, the modification
of university policies to allow him to complete his Ph.D.' Thus, were
Long unable to establish this connection, his claim would fail.'63
156. Id. at 846-48. The court did not agree with Nuzum's claims that he was
substantially limited in the major life activities of performing manual tasks, working, sleeping,
and "hugging." Id.
157. Id. at 848. "[Elven if Nuzum were held to be disabled by virtue of the hugging
limitation, it would not save his claim since he seeks an accommodation from his employer,
which must be related to the limitation in question." Id; see also Didier v. Schwan Food Co.,
465 F.3d 838, 842-43 (8th Cir. 2006).
158. District courts in other circuits have referred to the causal nexus doctrine with
approval. Mastronicola v. Principi, No. 2:04-CV-1655, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78879, at *20-
21 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2006); Kelly v. Sasol N. Am., Inc., No. CCB-05-1171, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 81860, at *17-18 (D. Md. Nov. 2, 2006). One district court in the Tenth Circuit
clarified that the circuit had not adopted the doctrine. Jirsa v. Utah Dep't of Transp., No.
2:03-CV-00425 JTG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13333, at *7-8 (C.D. Utah Mar 7, 2006).
159. 439 F. Supp. 2d 68, 70-73 (D.D.C. 2006).
160. Id. at 73. The university alleged that to accommodate Long as he desired, it would
have had to waive several specifically stated academic policies, including various time
limitations on doctoral candidacies. Id. at 76-77. It should be noted that Howard University
personnel did make some attempt to accommodate Long, at least initially, by waiving the
requirement that he do further research before defending his dissertation. Id. at 72.
161. Id. at 77-78.
162. Id. at 78. In the words of the court, the defendant maintained that Long was not
requesting the accommodation because of any "respiratory limitation," but rather because he
was "shiftless." Id.
163. Id.
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B. Reasonable Accommodation in the Seventh Circuit Before Squibb:
from Vande Zande to Yindee
Having outlined the development of the causal nexus doctrine as a
limitation on the ADA duty of reasonable accommodation, this Note
now reaches its focal point: the Seventh Circuit. In its 2006 opinion in
Yindee, the court asked and then declined to answer the central causal
nexus question of "whether a medical condition or symptom associated
with a disability must be accommodated independently, when the
associated condition is not serious enough to be a disability on its
own."' 6" In Squibb v. Memorial Medical Center, decided almost a year to
the date after Yindee, the court joined the Second, Eighth, and D.C.
Circuits in responding to this query with a resounding "no.,, 165 Before
addressing the court's decision in Squibb, however, both the Yindee
decision and several important preceding cases must be discussed.
1. Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration
Vande Zande was a pivotal case in Seventh Circuit ADA Title I
jurisprudence. Judge Posner, writing for the court in Vande Zande,
stated that "[tlhe concept of reasonable accommodation is at the heart
of this case."' 66 Indeed, a good portion of the opinion was dedicated to a
rather exhaustive general analysis of this critical ADA concept. 167 Only
when this analysis was complete did the court turn its attention to the
specific facts of the case.
The plaintiff, Lori Vande Zande, was paralyzed from the waist down
by a spinal cord tumor.' 6" As a result of her paralysis, Vande Zande
suffered from periodic pressure ulcers. ' 69 Her employer, the Wisconsin
Department of Administration, took several steps to accommodate her
disability, including physically modifying facilities at her workplace,
purchasing special furniture for her, and allowing her to make various
adjustments to her schedule. Vande Zande acknowledged these
accommodations but alleged that they were insufficient and brought suit
164. Yindee v. CCH Inc., 458 F.3d 599, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2006).
165. 497 F.3d 775, 785 (7th Cir. 2007); see also supra Part III.A.
166. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995).
167. See id. at 541-43.
168. Id. at 543.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 544.
[91:839
ADA CAUSAL NEXUS DOCTRINE
under Title I of the ADA. 171
Vande Zande's allegations of failure to accommodate were twofold.
One complaint, though not directly relevant here, was that certain
facilities in her workplace were not sufficiently accessible to her.172 The
other complaint, of greater interest for present purposes, was that the
defendant had not allowed her to work exclusively from home during an
eight-week flare-up of her pressure ulcers. 7 1 In this regard, Vande
Zande's supervisor had (1) refused to provide her with a home desktop
computer and (2) informed her that he could not provide forty hours of
at-home work for her, thus requiring her to "make up the difference"
from her sick leave.
The court found for the defendant regarding both of Vande Zande's
claimed failures to accommodate. It agreed with the State of Wisconsin
that "[a]n employer is not required to allow disabled workers to work at
home, where their productivity inevitably would be greatly reduced.
1 75
However, the court also went out of its way to dismiss one of the
defendant's alternative arguments: that Vande Zande's pressure ulcers
were "[i]ntermittent, episodic impairments" and thus not a disability.'76
The court distinguished a truly episodic impairment, such as a broken
leg,77 from "an intermittent impairment that is a characteristic
manifestation of an admitted disability [and that] is .. .a part of the
underlying disability and hence a condition that the employer must
reasonably accommodate.' 78 The court did not clearly identify whether
it considered Vande Zande's pressure ulcers to substantially limit one of
her major life activities, and thus to be a disability in and of themselves.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 545-46. Vande Zande's complaint centered on the height of the sink and
counter in the office kitchenette. Id. The court found that the employer had reasonably
accommodated her because she had "access to an equivalent sink, conveniently located." Id.
at 546.
173. See id. at 544.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 545.
176. Id. at 543-44.
177. Vande Zande has frequently been cited for its straightforward holding that such
"episodic" impairments as a broken leg do not fall under the ADA duty to reasonably
accommodate. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Godfather's Pizza, Inc., 141 F. App'x 473, 476 (7th Cir.
2005) (burned hand that healed within a month); Harrington v. Rice Lake Weighing Sys.,
Inc., 122 F.3d 456, 460 (7th Cir. 1997) (neck injury accompanied by only temporary work
restrictions); Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 1995) (arthritic condition in legs).
178. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544.
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2. From Vande Zande to Yindee
Two Seventh Circuit cases decided between Vande Zande and
Yindee warrant brief mention. Those two cases remained ambiguous as
to whether intermittent impairments need to qualify as disabilities
themselves to warrant reasonable accommodation. In upholding a
verdict for the plaintiff in Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment
Co., the court held that the "episodic flares" that characterized her
lupus were "part of her disability and part of what Time Warner had a
duty to accommodate within reason."'79 Two years later, in Schneiker v.
Fortis Insurance Co., the plaintiff asserted two disabilities: alcoholism
and depression.' 8° The court cited Vande Zande in stating that "[it
would] consider [the plaintiff's] alleged alcoholism to the extent that it
could be an intermittent impairment manifesting her depression." '181
Again, though the court determined that the plaintiff's depression was
not a disability and thus found for the defendant,1 it did not describe
the circumstances under which her intermittent impairment of
alcoholism would have required accommodation.
3. Yindee v. CCH Inc.
Yindee was the most recent Seventh Circuit Title I case preceding
Squibb in which a plaintiff claimed that an employer was required to
accommodate an aspect or manifestation of a disability that may not
have qualified as a disability in and of itself. In this instance, the
plaintiff, Malinee Yindee, was hired by CCH in 2000 as a programmer
analyst. 83 Due to cancer (endometrial carcinoma) and other health
issues, Yindee spent a significant portion of her three years as a CCH
employee on medical leave.'8 She was forced to undergo a
hysterectomy and experienced other problems, including bouts of
vertigo and frequent headaches.'9 After she was fired in January 2003,
Yindee brought suit under the ADA, alleging both failure to
accommodate and retaliation.1 6
179. 151 F.3d 591, 600 (7th Cir. 1998).
180. 200 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2000).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1062.
183. Yindee v. CCH Inc., 458 F.3d 599, 600 (7th Cir. 2006).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 600-01. In response, CCH contended "that it tried to accommodate Yindee
and that the discharge stemmed from a decline in her performance." Id.
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The district court granted CCH summary judgment. 18 7 It dismissed
Yindee's failure to accommodate claim by asserting that she was not
disabled and concluded that there was insufficient evidence of
retaliation to proceed. 8' The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district
court's rationale, but nevertheless affirmed."9 Rather than concluding
that Yindee did not have a disability, it instead noted that "[t]he price of
curing Yindee's cancer and saving her life was sterility, which assuredly
is a 'disability' under the ADA."' 9  However, while the court
acknowledged Yindee's sterility as a genuine disability, it pointed out
that her requested accommodation was for vertigo, which not even her
own doctor could say was "an aspect of her genuine disability
(infertility).' 91  Thus, as the court phrased it, "we need not decide
whether a medical condition or symptom associated with a disability
must be accommodated independently, when the associated condition is
not serious enough to be a disability on its own."'9'  However, had
evidence existed linking Yindee's vertigo to her infertility, the court
would have had no choice but to decide whether to adopt or reject the
"causal nexus" approach. A year later, though it did not need to do so
to resolve the case, the court felt compelled to address this question in
Squibb v. Memorial Medical Center.'9
C. The Seventh Circuit Adopts the Causal Nexus Approach:
Squibb v. Memorial Medical Center
Mary Rios Squibb was employed by Memorial Medical Center
(Memorial) as a certified nurse assistant and a registered nurse between
1990 and 2005. While performing her job duties, Ms. Squibb suffered
three back injuries between 1993 and 2000, the first and third of which
required surgery.'9 Following the December 2000 surgery for her third
back injury, Ms. Squibb embarked on what the Seventh Circuit
187. Id. at 601.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 601, 603.
190. Id. at 601.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 602. The court also found that Yindee had failed to establish a prima facie
case of retaliation. Id. at 602-03.
193. 497 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2007).
194. Id. at 778-79.
195. Id. at 778.
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described as an "employment odyssey,"' '9 during which she was subject
to several different sets of physician-imposed restrictions and was placed
in a number of temporary positions." Her odyssey ended with her
termination in January of 2005,19 by which point she had already
brought an action against Memorial for various violations of the ADA
and for wrongful discharge under the Illinois Workers Compensation
Act ("IWCA").'
The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois
granted Memorial's motion for summary judgment on all of Squibb's
ADA claims.2°° The district court found that (1) Squibb was not a
person with a disability, (2) that her restrictions would not allow her to
perform the essential functions of the positions that she desired even
with a reasonable accommodation, and (3) that there was insufficient
evidence to support her retaliation claim.2°' In affirming the district
court, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the first and third points2°2 and
declined to address the second."' Interestingly, however, while
purporting to avoid the reasonable accommodation question, the court
actually made an extremely significant statement about precisely that
issue.
Squibb claimed that she was disabled as a result of substantial
limitations on several of her major life activities, including working,2°,
196. Id. at 779.
197. See id. at 778-79.
198. Id. at 779. Ms. Squibb was terminated for failure to return from leave after she
declined a position as a clinical case manager because she thought that her duties would not
comply with her restrictions. Id. at 780.
199. See id. at 779-80. Squibb's specific ADA claims included failure to reasonably
accommodate her disability, refusal to hire her for various positions, wrongful termination,
and retaliation. Id.
200. Id. at 780. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Squibb's
workers compensation claims. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 789. "Ms. Squibb has not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine
issue of fact as to whether she is disabled within the meaning of the Act; neither has she
presented evidence that the adverse employment actions she suffered were taken by
Memorial in retaliation for her statutorily protected activities." Id.
203. Id. at 786. "Because we have concluded that Ms. Squibb is not disabled within the
meaning of the Act, . . . [wie need not examine her reasonable accommodation ... claims
further." Id.
204. Id. at 781-83. The court concluded that Squibb was not substantially limited in the
major life activity of working because she could not show that she was "'significantly
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities."'
[91:839
ADA CAUSAL NEXUS DOCTRINE
sleeping,2°1 caring for herself,2°6 sitting, and walking." After rejecting
each of these claims, the court turned to Squibb's final contention: that
she was substantially limited in the major life activity of sexual
relations.2 ' The court noted that, while sexual reproduction is a
recognized major life activity for ADA purposes, sexual relations may
not be.2 ' Regardless of that distinction, the court concluded that
Squibb's testimony regarding the effect that her back injuries had on her
210
sex life was insufficient evidence of a substantial limitation .
The court did not stop there. Though it had already rebuffed
Squibb's claim of a substantial limitation on the major life activity of
sexual relations, it imitated the Eighth Circuit in Wood2" and advanced
the analysis a step further. After questioning how an employer "would
accommodate a disability that restricted the plaintiff's ability to engage
in sexual relations, '2t 2 the court explained that it "agree[d] with [its]
colleagues in the Eighth Circuit that, to the extent an ADA
discrimination claim centers on a request for a workplace
accommodation, there must be some causal connection between the
major life activity that is limited and the accommodation sought., 213 In
other words, though it did so in dicta, the court took up the causal nexus
approach to ADA reasonable accommodation jurisprudence.
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND THE CAUSAL NEXUS DOCTRINE:
A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
The Squibb decision stands out as a missed opportunity for the
Id. at 782 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2007)).
205. Id. at 784. The court found that Squibb's unsubstantiated claims of interrupted
sleep were insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact absent additional evidence.
Id.
206. Id. The limitations on personal care activities asserted by Squibb were deemed
insufficiently substantial by the court. Id.
207. Id. at 784-85. "Even taking Ms. Squibb's contentions regarding her ability to walk
or sit at face value, her assertion that she needs breaks every thirty minutes does not compare
to the claims this court has held should survive summary judgment." Id. at 785 (citing EEOC
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 802 (7th Cir. 2005)).
208. Id. at 785.
209. Id.
210. Id. "Although her own deposition testimony states that she has been unable to
engage in sexual relations for two years due to her back pain, she has provided no other
evidence of her claimed sexual limitation .... " Id.
211. Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 686-87 (8th Cir. 2003).
212. Squibb, 497 F.3d at 785.
213. Id.
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Seventh Circuit. In embracing the Felix causal nexus rule, the court
chose to continue the constricted approach to ADA interpretation
widely endorsed by the federal courts since the Act took effect in 1990.
In so doing, it squandered a chance to uphold the intent of the Act's
drafters. Given the existence of appropriate precedents, the language of
the ADA, and the vital public policy considerations essential to the Act,
the Seventh Circuit would have properly interpreted the ADA if it had
refused to require a causal connection between substantially limited
major life activities and the reasonable accommodations requested by
employees with disabilities.
A. Cases Both Within and Outside of the Seventh Circuit Have
Rejected the Causal Nexus Doctrine
Felix notwithstanding, there are several decisions that, when
properly read, do not require a causal connection between the
accommodations requested by an employee and his or her "substantially
limited major life activity. 2 4 Foremost among these cases outside of
the Seventh Circuit are Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc.215 and
McAlindin v. County of San Diego.216 In the Seventh Circuit, they
218 Arnolinclude Vande Zande,1 7 Haschmann,  and Arnold v. County of Cook.2 9
1. McAlindin and Lovejoy-Wilson
As the Felix appellants pointed out in their brief, aspects of both
Lovejoy-Wilson and McAlindin contradict the causal nexus approach. 0
In McAlindin, the plaintiff claimed that his anxiety and panic disorders
substantially limited him in three major life activities: sexual relations,
sleeping, and interacting with others.22' The court held that McAlindin
was disabled by these disorders and reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for his disability discrimination claim.222 In an
214. See generally Timmons, supra note 14, at 331-34.
215. 263 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2001).
216. 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999).
217. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
218. Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 151 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1998).
219. 220 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
220. Brief of Appellants at 26-27, Felix v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 01-7967 (2d
Cir. Dec. 7, 2001).
221. 192 F.3d at 1232-35.
222. Id. at 1238, 1240. The court affirmed summary judgment regarding McAlindin's
retaliation claim. Id. at 1238-40.
[91:839
ADA CAUSAL NEXUS DOCTRINE
amended opinion, it stated that "[t]he two inquiries-namely, whether
McAlindin is disabled and what constitutes reasonable accommodation
for that disability-only intersect to the extent that McAlindin's
disability manifests itself in the workplace., 23 Such language implies
that as long as an accommodation relates to the ability of the person
with a disability to work, it can be considered reasonable. The court's
limit on the extent to which the definitions of disabled and reasonable
accommodation "intersect" is essentially the same as a limit on the
extent to which a causal nexus is required. In other words, an
accommodation is reasonable if it helps a genuinely disabled person to
perform his or her job without imposing an undue hardship on the
employer.
Though the court's language in Lovejoy-Wilson224 is not as instructive
as in McAlindin, the implications of its decision are equally contrary to
the causal nexus doctrine. The plaintiff, a person whose epilepsy was
concededly a disability, requested a workplace accommodation for her
inability to drive.2 2 5 Despite the fact that driving is not a major life
activity, the court reversed summary judgment against the plaintiff.22 6 In
so doing, it clearly expressed the principle that an accommodation can
be required even when it is not directly related to a substantially limited
major life activity. 7
2. Vande Zande, Haschmann, and Arnold
Neither the Vande Zande nor the Haschmann cases require a causal
nexus between a limited major life activity and a requested
accommodation. As is discussed above, the Vande Zande court held
that intermittent impairments can require reasonable accommodation if
they are "part of the underlying disability., 228 The court notably did not
require that to necessitate accommodation, such impairments limit a
major life activity. Furthermore, the Vande Zande court's definition of
accommodation is enlightening: "[t]he employer must be willing to
consider making changes in its ordinary work rules, facilities, terms, and
223. McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 201 F.3d 1211, 1211 (9th Cir. 2000).
224. Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2001).
225. Id. at 213.
226. Id. at 217-18.
227. See also Otting v. J.C. Penney Co., 223 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that
employer had to accommodate activity of climbing ladders for plaintiff with acknowledged
disability of epilepsy, even though climbing ladders is not itself a major life activity).
228. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995).
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conditions in order to enable a disabled individual to work."229 The
court explained that the reasonableness of an accommodation is really
determined by a cost-benefit analysis,23° and made no mention of an
accommodation being unreasonable due to the lack of a causal nexus.
Citing Vande Zande three years later, the Haschmann court similarly
made no mention of a causal nexus requirement in holding that a jury
could reasonably find that Time Warner was required to accommodate
the plaintiff's lupus flares.'
While Vande Zande and Haschmann implicitly contradicted the
causal nexus approach, a 2002 decision in the Northern District of
Illinois directly challenged the Felix rule. Though the claim in Arnold
was brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973232 and not the ADA,
the principles at issue are identical. The plaintiff, Jon Arnold, asserted
that several of his major life activities (including driving, pushing,
pulling, standing, sitting, bending, lifting, carrying, and walking) were
limited by his back and neck injuries, and thus that he had a disability.233
However, the only accommodation that he requested was related to his
driving duties.234 In response to his claim, the defendant employed the
causal nexus doctrine, arguing that since driving is not considered a
major life activity, Arnold was not entitled to the requested
accommodation.2 3 The court, relying on the language of the ADA,
disagreed with the defendant and with the Felix court, commenting that
"[t]he only nexus required between the limitation that qualifies an
individual as disabled and the limitation for which accommodation is
requested is that both be caused by a common physical or mental
condition., 236 The court stated that "[t]he fundamental purpose of the
ADA is... served directly by requiring employers to accommodate the
limitations of employees where those limitations derive from a
disability., 237  Put differently, the major life activity requirement is
merely a threshold for disability status; it is not determinative of what
229. Id. at 542.
230. Id. at 542-43.
231. Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 151 F.3d 591, 600 (7th Cir. 1998).
232. Arnold v. County of Cook, 220 F. Supp. 2d 893, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see also 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000).
233. Arnold, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 895.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 896.
237. Id. at 897.
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accommodations are reasonable.
B. Courts Adopting the Causal Nexus Doctrine Have Misread the
Language of the ADA Regarding the Duty of
Reasonable Accommodation
At the heart of any discussion of the causal nexus doctrine is an
apparently simple question: What does the ADA require employers to
accommodate? 8 More to the point, is the ADA about accommodating
people, disabilities, impairments, limitations, or some combination
thereof? For most of the courts that have adopted the doctrine, the
answer is that employers must accommodate limitations-specifically,
only those limitations that substantially limit a major life activity.239 This
interpretation of the ADA, while seemingly rooted in the statutory
language, is in fact a mischaracterization.
As the Northern District of Illinois pointed out in Arnold, this
mischaracterization centers on the word "limitation.""24 It is true that
the ADA requires employers to accommodate "the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability."24 ' In Felix, Wood, and their progeny, however, the courts
have equated that meaning of "limitation" with the meaning of
"substantial limitation" that is part of the definition of disability."2 This
approach, by which the causal nexus courts have defined disability solely
in terms of the limited major life activity, is an unreasonably narrow
one.243 Though a plaintiff must have a substantial limitation on a major
238. See supra Part III.A.
239. See, e.g., Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2003). Not all
of the causal nexus courts have been clear as to what employers are supposed to be
accommodating under the causal nexus approach. For example, while the Seventh Circuit in
Squibb offered a causal nexus analysis closely akin to that of the Eighth Circuit in Wood and
Nuzum, the court's language nevertheless included a reference to accommodating a
"disability" and not a limitation. Squibb v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 785 (7th Cir.
2007). The use of this terminology thus directly contradicted a central premise of the causal
nexus doctrine as outlined in Wood and Nuzum: employers must accommodate limitations
rather than disabilities. See Wood, 339 F.3d at 687; Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distrib., 432 F.3d
839, 848 (8th Cir. 2005).
240. 220 F. Supp. 2d at 896-97.
241. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
242. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2007). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), with 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). As the Arnold court put it, "the only thing the two phrases have in
common is the word limit." 220 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
243. An example of this phenomenon occurred in Felix, in which the court classified the
plaintiff's disability as insomnia, rather than PTSD, because she was substantially limited in
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life activity to qualify as a person with a disability under the ADA, it
does not automatically follow that an employer need accommodate only
those limitations that substantially affect a major life activity.
A more reasonable reading of the ADA's language would also
require employers to accommodate a disabled employee's limitations.
However, rather than only mandating accommodation of substantial
limitations on major life activities, such an interpretation would entail
accommodation of all limitations resulting from the underlying
disability.244 In this sort of a scheme, the substantial limitation on a
major life activity language of the ADA would be placed in its proper
context as a threshold requirement for ADA coverage rather than as a
definition of the term disability itself.2 4  Once a person passed this
disability threshold, he or she would be entitled to accommodation of
any disability-related limitations, regardless of whether they
substantially limited the person with the disability in a major life
activity. Thus the only causal nexus required would be between the
accommodation sought and the employee's disabling impairment or
condition.246
This alternative to the Felix doctrine will hardly result in that court's
imagined doomsday scenario of ADA plaintiffs run amok.247 First, the
the major life activity of sleeping. Felix v. New York City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 107
(2d Cir. 2003). In so doing, the court relied only upon its unsupported assertion that "we do
not view her insomnia and fear of the subway as a singular mental condition." Id. Similarly,
the Yindee court recognized Yindee's disability as infertility rather than cancer because she
was limited in the major life activity of procreation. Yindee v. CCH Inc., 458 F.3d 599, 601-02
(7th Cir. 2006). It is true that Yindee's cancer had gone into remission. Id. However, her
contention that it remained her disability for purposes of the ADA was a reasonable one
given the language in Williams requiring that an "impairment's impact must ... be permanent
or long term." Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). In both
cases, the courts refused to treat the limitation on a major life activity as a threshold for
determining disability status, instead defining the disability in terms of the life activity
affected.
244. See Arnold, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 896 ("The only nexus required between the
limitation that qualifies an individual as disabled and the limitation for which [the]
accommodation is requested is that both be caused by a common physical or mental
condition.").
245. Note that the Felix court itself refers to the existence of a substantial limitation on a
major life activity as a "threshold for seeking redress under the ADA," though it clearly is
advancing a very narrow definition of disability defined solely by the major life activity in
which a plaintiff is limited. Felix, 324 F.3d at 107.
246. See Arnold, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
247. See Felix, 324 F.3d at 107 (lamenting the possibility that, absent the causal nexus
doctrine, an employee "not otherwise impaired in a major life activity but suffer[ing]
debilitating anxiety or stress from a particular job could get to a jury merely by alleging that
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Supreme Court in Sutton and Williams advanced very limited
characterizations of substantial limitation and major life activity."8
Consequently, many prospective Title I plaintiffs will never reach the
point in their claims where the causal nexus doctrine could come into
play. Second, there are safeguards built into the statutory scheme that
protect employers from having to accommodate employees in a manner
that is unreasonable 249 or that imposes an undue hardship. °
C. The Causal Nexus Doctrine Is Contrary to Critical Public
Policy Aims Embodied by the ADA
As the preceding section demonstrates, courts that have adopted the
Felix causal nexus doctrine have interpreted the text of the ADA in an
unreasonably limited fashion. In one sense, the Felix rule can be seen as
merely part of a larger whole because multiple aspects of the Act have
been construed narrowly.5 More precisely, though, there is a critical
concern at the root of the causal nexus doctrine-a concern that, in the
words of the Felix court, unchecked application of the ADA will result
in "a preference for disabled people generally" '252 and "treat[ment of]
people with disabilities better than others who are not disabled but have
the same impairment for which accommodation is sought.,
253
To this concern, the Arnold court provided a simple retort when it
observed that "[e]very accommodation is in some sense of a
preference., 254 Indeed, it is an essential underlying premise of the ADA
that people with disabilities are entitled to accommodation because they
are different from their non-disabled fellow citizens. In the words of the
Act's opening section, the difference lies in the fact that
individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with restrictions and
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political
the job causes insomnia, difficulty breathing, or some other set of disabling symptoms that
can be characterized as a syndrome").
248. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Williams, 534 U.S. 184.
249. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
250. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
251. See supra Parts II.C.l.b-c.
252. Felix, 324 F.3d at 107.
253. Id.
254. Arnold v. County of Cook, 220 F. Supp. 2d 893, 897 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics
that are beyond the control of such individuals and
resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
participate in, and contribute to, society."'
Such a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" justifies the minimal
extent to which disabled persons might be said to receive preferential
treatment under the ADA. As the ADARA's drafters point out, people
with physical or mental impairments are often subjected to "prejudice,
antiquated attitudes, or the failure to remove societal and institutional
barriers., 25 6 The ADA's purpose is to level the playing field for such
people-a purpose that the Felix doctrine disregards.
The causal connection doctrine is especially unforgiving in its
application to plaintiffs with multi-symptom medical conditions or
diseases. When courts narrowly define disabilities in terms of a limited
major life activity, as opposed to treating the substantial limitation on a
major life activity language as a threshold to ADA coverage, the results
can be harsh.21' This is particularly true of mental health impairments
like PTSD and physical ailments such as fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue
syndrome, and multiple chemical sensitivity. While there is significant
scientific evidence that these conditions are genuine medical problems,
many people remain skeptical as to the authenticity of these diseases.258
Consequently, those ADA plaintiffs (like Denise Felix) who suffer from
such impairments must endure not only their physical and mental
symptoms but also the disbelief of co-workers or supervisors, who may
perceive them as lazy, irresponsible, or mentally unstable. Courts that
use the causal nexus doctrine to apply the ADA in an unreasonably
narrow fashion thus contravene the public policy aims of the Act by
buttressing, rather than undermining, the prejudice and stigma facing
people with disabilities.
255. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).
256. S. 1881, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(3), (1st Sess. 2007).
257. See supra note 243.
258. See Sarah Boseley, A Very Modern Epidemic, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 27, 2001,
at 16, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/health/story/0,3605,558711,00.html (noting that
those who suffer from such conditions "are prisoners to some extent of disbelief but to a
greater extent of helplessness on the part of the medical profession"). See also generally
Ruby Afram, Note, New Diagnoses and the ADA: A Case Study of Fibromyalgia and Mutliple
Chemical Sensitivity, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 85 (2004).
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V. CONCLUSION
Justice Harlan, dissenting in the pivotal 1971 Fourth Amendment
case of United States v. White, described the "task of the law" as "to
form and project, as well as mirror and reflect., 259 Though these words
might be construed in a number of ways, they certainly seem to highlight
the important role of the courts in society as a whole. While the courts
interpret the laws that reflect society's values at a given time, they also
give form to those laws. A judicial decision does more than tell people
what the law "is"-it influences their beliefs and attitudes. Nowhere is
this truer than in the realm of ADA jurisprudence.
Before embracing the causal connection doctrine in its Squibb
decision, the Seventh Circuit would have done well to recall Justice
Harlan's words regarding the power of the law. By applying such an
unduly narrow interpretation of the ADA duty of reasonable
accommodation, the court has missed its chance to curtail the personal
prejudice still experienced today by many Americans with disabilities.
In failing to recognize what the drafters of the ADARA know-that
judicial construction of the ADA has rendered it largely impotent-the
Seventh Circuit has misread the Act's language and betrayed its goals.
Hopefully, those circuits that have yet to address the Felix doctrine will
choose a different path.
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259. 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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